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Special issue introduction: What are Religious beliefs? 
The question of how religion ought to be defined has occupied social scientists for well 
over a century, arguably beginning with reactions against E. B. Tylor’s (1871) “minimal 
definition” of religion as the belief in spiritual beings. Social scientists of religion are all too 
familiar with the debates over emic and etic approaches to defining religion, as well as the 
pros and cons of substantive versus functionalist definitions. More recently, cognitive 
scientists of religion seem to have just taken Tylor as their starting point, treating the belief in 
supernatural agents as their central explanandum (e.g., Barrett and Lanman 2008; Boyer 
1994; Guthrie 1993). “Belief” is no less of a theoretical term than is “religion”, and no less 
deserving of attention, interrogation, and clarification by the scholars who use it. With very 
few exceptions, critical discussion of this central concept within the psychological science of 
religion has been absent (Lanman 2008).  
 As Jong (2013) observes, theoretical understandings of belief are under-developed in 
the psychological sciences more broadly, in contrast to the research literatures on other 
constructs like emotions (e.g., Barrett & Russell 2015; Ekman & Davidson 1995) and 
attitudes (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken 1993; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given their normative epistemological concerns, philosophers and theologians have done 
considerably more groundwork in this area (e.g., Bishop 2007; Cohen 1995; Nottelmann 
2013), but it is unclear if the fruits of their labour will trickle down in such a way as to 
benefit social and psychological scientists. The goal of this special issue is therefore to bridge 
the gap between the humanities and the sciences, to begin a long overdue conversation about 
the possible nature of religious belief. 
 
Six views on the nature of religious belief 
WHAT ARE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS? 
3 
 
In his “Beliefs are object-attribute associations of varying strength," social 
psychologist Jonathan Jong begins by considering how social and cognitive psychological 
theories about attitudes might inform the analytic philosophical literature on propositional 
attitudes, of which belief is a paradigmatic example. Jong’s account of beliefs—in terms of 
associations between concepts—does not treat religious beliefs any differently from beliefs in 
other domains in terms of their cognitive structure. Religious beliefs are just beliefs about 
gods and other religious entities or events; like other beliefs, they are cognitive associations 
between object concepts (e.g., God) and existential (e.g., real, imaginary) or truth-value (e.g., 
true, false) concepts. Therefore, the same questions about other kinds of beliefs—about 
measurement; stability and change; relationships to identity and behaviour—all also apply to 
religious beliefs. This is not to suggest that the answers to such questions will be the same 
across different domains of belief: religious beliefs may be more or less tentatively held than 
other beliefs; they may be more or less chronically accessible than other beliefs; they may be 
more or less predictive of behaviour or tied up with social identity than beliefs or amenable to 
modification. These are all empirical questions, to be answered in part using tools designed to 
measure and manipulate beliefs more broadly.   
Psychological anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann does draw a distinction between 
religious and other kinds of beliefs in her essay "The Faith Frame: or, belief is easy, faith is 
hard". She points out that common language about religious beliefs differs from language 
about other beliefs; religious beliefs are tied to identity; religious explanations function 
differently from nonreligious ones; religious beliefs are not evaluated as other beliefs are; and 
they are highly context-sensitive. Building on these observations, Luhrmann posits a “faith 
frame” and an “everyday frame”, different modes of evaluating experience and evidence, like 
the kind of difference Gregory Bateson (1955) drew between play and non-play. When 
someone of faith thinks about God, they evaluate God-related sentences differently, and draw 
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different interferences, from the way they evaluate non-faith related claims. People of faith 
may say that God is omnipotent, for example, but, she argues, they do not really behave that 
way. 
Luhrmann’s approach builds on philosopher Neil Van Leeuwen’s previous work (e.g., 
2014, 2017b) on religious credence, on which he elaborates in his contribution to this special 
issue, “The factual belief fallacy”. The paper begins as a response to critics—chiefly Boudry 
and Coyne (2016) and Levy (2017)—and is therefore part of an on-going discussion about 
whether and how religious and everyday beliefs should be distinguished from one another 
(see also Van Leeuwen 2016, 2017a). It then proceeds, as Jong’s paper did, by discussing a 
variety of attitudes that people take toward their mental representations and the objects to 
which they refer. Unlike Jong, however, Van Leeuwen distinguishes between two different 
cognitive attitudes that are commonly called beliefs, namely factual beliefs and religious 
credences. However, the difference between these is not their structure but the way they are 
processed. By this, Van Leeuwen refers, in this paper, mainly to the way they are activated to 
guide our behaviours: (religious) credences are practical setting dependent, triggered only in 
very specific contexts, whereas (factual) beliefs are practical setting independent. 
Despite their on-going disagreement about the nature of religious belief, philosopher 
Neil Levy draws a similar distinction as Van Leeuwen’s practical setting (in)dependence 
distinction; indeed, Levy provides an explanation for practical setting dependence. In “In 
Praise of Outsourcing”, he argues that belief activation is context sensitive to the extent that it 
is coupled to external cues. Some religious beliefs are thus coupled, and are therefore only 
activated when the relevant cues are present. Crucially, however, “coupled representations” 
and “religious representations” fail to be coextensive categories; contra Van Leeuwen, the 
relationship between them is such that one should not be treated as a heuristic for the other.  
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Theologian Tobias Tan also focusses on the context sensitivity of religious beliefs, 
but not as a means of distinguishing religious from other kinds of belief. Rather, in his 
“William James and Embodied Religious Belief”, Tan considers the implications of a view of 
cognition that attends to the contextual, action-oriented, and affect-laden nature of beliefs in 
general. He observes that many findings in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) literature 
are already consistent with this view, and encourages the field to extend itself further in this 
direction. Along similar lines as Tan, philosopher Hans van Eyghen also argues for a more 
embodied, embedded, and distributed account of religious belief than the ones he has found 
in CSR.  
 
Toward rapprochement  
The purpose of scientific definition is to guide research, by paving the way toward 
operationalisation and measurement and by posing novel questions and hypotheses. Taken 
together, these contributions to this special issue do suggest several new lines of inquiry. The 
central disagreement—over the relationship between religious and everyday beliefs—turns 
out to be an empirically tractable one. Van Leeuwen claims that some beliefs are practical 
setting dependent, and others are practical setting independent. Levy claims that some beliefs 
are coupled to external cues, and others are not. Levy further claims that coupling explains 
practical setting dependence. Their central disagreement is over the heuristic value of 
associating religious beliefs with one side of either distinction. Van Leeuwen’s distinction 
between religious credences and factual beliefs requires that religious beliefs are much more 
likely to be practical setting dependent than independent, and also that practical setting 
dependent beliefs are much more likely to be religious than mundane. If the overlap between 
the religious and practical setting dependent is too thin, then they fail to serve as useful 
proxies for one another.  
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Regardless of how this debate turns out, the distinctions drawn by Luhrmann, Van 
Leeuwen, and Levy also raise questions about the conditions under which the cognitive states 
in question obtain. What are the relevant inputs for the faith frame to be activated? Why are 
some beliefs practical setting dependent and other not? How do representations get coupled? 
Given that Tan’s and van Egyhen’s contributions argue from a general perspective on 
cognition, they not only challenge researchers to re-conceptualise religious beliefs but beliefs 
more broadly: perhaps our everyday or practical setting independent or uncoupled beliefs are 
also more contextual, goal-directed, socially-embedded, and affect-laden than we have 
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